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What is the best way to manage unlike human capacities 
in the name of human progress and improvement? This 
deceptively simple question has preoccupied Western 
political modernity, especially in the United States. The 
positive connotations often adhering to the keyword 
“diversity”—a term commonly used to reference 
human differences broadly considered—arise from its 
importance in high-status discourses that have sought 
to discern the best management of human differences, 
including eighteenth-century liberal political philosophy, 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century natural science 
(especially the so-called race sciences), and twentieth- 
and twenty-first-century law and education policy. In 
contrast, research in American studies and cultural 
studies has come to look on the endeavor of managing 
human differences in a suspicious light (Ferguson 2012). 
It recognizes that ideologies of progress and development 
from Manifest Destiny to multiculturalism have 
consistently, and sometimes in surprising ways, divided 
people into good (desirable) and bad (undesirable) forms 
of human diversity, creating hierarchies that evaluate 
groups as more or less civilized, capable, advanced, or 
valuable according to a shifting catalogue of criteria 
(Horsman 1981; Cacho 2012; Melamed 2011). This 
research suggests that these attempts to divide humanity 
are symptomatic of a fundamental contradiction 
between political democracy, which defines citizens as 
equal and working cooperatively for collective well-being, 
and capitalism, in which individuals of unequal material 
means and social advantages compete with one another 





Viewed in this light, discourses of diversity are a 
form of crisis management; they portray the inequality 
that capitalism requires as the result of differing 
human capacities, inaccurately representing groups 
dispossessed by and for capital accumulation as being 
in need of the improvements of civilization, education, 
or freedom. The result is that “diversity” has come to 
be seen as an ambiguous term that endows its referent— 
human differences—with only an indistinct and 
opaque legibility, making it easier to displace the causes 
of capitalism’s structural unevenness onto naturalized 
fictions of human differences. Karl Marx’s example of 
the nursery tale told by bourgeois political economists 
to explain the origin of capitalist wealth speaks to this 
cultural process (1867/1976). The tale involves two kinds 
of people who lived long ago: diligent, frugal elites 
who conserved the fruits of their labor so their progeny 
could become capitalists; and lazy, spendthrift masses 
who burned through their substance in riotous living 
so their heirs (wage laborers) have nothing to sell but 
themselves. This fable about the origins of human 
diversity (versions of which are still told every day) 
substitutes for the real acts of force that have expanded 
capital flows, including conquest, enslavement, land 
grabbing, and accumulation through dispossession 
(Harvey 2003). Diversity operates here as a ruse that 
naturalizes social inequality by inverting cause and 
effect. 
The intertwined usage histories of the keywords 
“diversity” and “race” are central to this ruse. They 
appear together first across two disparate yet interrelated 
domains that influenced the organization of U.S. 
modernity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: 
liberal political philosophy and the race sciences. Both 
of these discourses were concerned with discerning 
and cultivating human differences, though to very 
different ends. Liberal political philosophers   ranging 
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/1968) to John Stuart 
Mill (1859/1869) advocated the free play of the “good” 
diversity of European talents, interests, and beliefs as 
the means and end of a free society. In contrast, the race 
sciences of the period were concerned with controlling 
“bad” diversity, conceived as the biological inferiority 
of nonwhite races, through sterilization, termination, 
incarceration, and exclusion. Harry Laughlin, for 
example, the United States’ leading eugenicist in the 
first half of the twentieth century, argued in the context 
of debates over the passage of the Johnson-Reed  Act 
in 1924 that “progress cannot be built on mongrel 
melting-pots, but it is based on organized diversity of 
relatively pure racial types” (Laughlin and Trevor 1939, 
18). The naturalization of race in relation to the category 
of diversity is what made credible these otherwise 
contradictory frameworks for understanding human 
difference. Concepts of diversity and race worked 
together to define “the white race” as so superior to 
others that freedom and self-cultivation were only 
beneficial and available to them, thus assuaging 
conflicts between philosophical commitments to 
individual liberty and the realities of economic systems 
dependent on the coercions of slavery, poverty, and 
industrialization. 
During and after World War II, white supremacy 
and biological concepts of race were discredited by  
an accumulation of sociopolitical forces including 
worldwide rejection of German National Socialist (Nazi) 
racism and antisemitism, anticolonial and antiracist 
struggles, and global labor migrations from the rural 
South to  the metropolitan North (Winant  2001). As  
a result, the usage of the terms “diversity” and “race” 
became even more complexly related. The geopolitical 
context shaping their new meanings and relationship 
was the rise of the United States to the position of Cold 
War superpower and leading force for the  expansion 
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of transnational capitalism. In order to accomplish 
these postwar leadership goals, the United States began 
to sanction and promote a specific kind of liberal 
antiracism. The intent of this form of antiracism was to 
modernize and extend freedoms once reserved for white/ 
European Americans to all U.S. inhabitants regardless of 
race. These liberal freedoms became the meaning and 
goal of antiracism: possessive individualism, the right 
to self-cultivation, abstract legal equality, and access to 
the field of economic competition. Yet strengthening 
political democracy by ending white monopolies on 
liberal freedoms could not serve as an antidote for the 
structurally uneven relationships developed within 
global capitalism. The problem was and is that the 
conceptual framework for liberal antiracism overlapped 
with the knowledge architecture of global capitalism 
through the promotion of individualism and economic 
competition as foundational for racial equality and 
capitalist development. 
As conflicts between democratic ideology and 
capitalist economy continued to emerge under new 
conditions, questions of how to best manage unlike 
human capacities in the name of progress, reform, and 
improvement continued to provide cover for the next 
phases of global capitalism. The ruse of racialization 
lives on: forms of humanity are valued and devalued 
in ways that fit the needs of reigning political- 
economic orders. Conventional understandings of 
race as skin color or phenotype no longer dominate 
the process. Instead, criteria of class, culture, religion, 
and citizenship status assume the role that race has 
played historically, positioning individuals who benefit 
from differential power arrangements as “fit” for 
success (good diversity) and those who are structurally 
exploited or excluded by power arrangements as “unfit” 
(bad diversity). As “racial difference” gets redefined as 
“cultural,” the language of diversity takes on the burden 
previously borne by race. Though race never vanished 
as a means of managing difference, the emphasis on 
culture creates a situation that is both flexible and 
productive, allowing new categories of difference and 
diversity to evolve in relation to the crises perpetrated 
by global capital. 
Beginning in the 1970s, law and educational policy 
became the dominant domains for these discussions   
of how  to  manage human differences in  the name  
of progress and reform, with affirmative action law 
being most prominent. Beginning with Supreme Court 
Justice William Powell’s watershed decision, Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke (438 U.S. 265 
(1978)), affirmative action discourse has conditioned 
the meaning of diversity and, in the process, redefined 
how the state can recognize and act on racial inequality. 
In his decision, Justice Powell deployed the keyword 
“diversity” no less than thirty times. His point was  
to invalidate all but one of the reasons offered by the 
University of California–Davis School of Medicine for 
reserving a few admission slots for students identified as 
“economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” or 
members of “minority groups” (Regents, 438 U.S. at 274). 
He found it unconstitutional to use race in admissions to 
counter discrimination, to break up white monopolies 
on medical training, or to increase the well-being of 
communities of color (by training more physicians of 
color). The only admissible ground for taking race into 
consideration was “obtaining the educational benefits 
that flow from a diverse student body” (Regents,  438 
U.S. at 306). By ruling that “educational diversity” is 
protected under the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment, Powell negated material social change as 
a racial justice goal, replacing it with consideration for 
higher education’s mission to provide all students with 
opportunities for self-cultivation through exposure to 
diversity. The decision rests on the capacity of diversity 
 
86 D I V  E R  S I T Y J ODI   M E L A M E D 
 
 
to abstract and generalize human differences in a way 
that forestalls more precise and relational analysis. It 
positions “racial justice” as anathema to “genuine 
diversity,” defined only vaguely as “a far broader array 
of qualifications and characteristics” (Regents, 438 U.S. 
at 315). 
Twenty-five years later, the next wave of Supreme 
Court affirmative action cases (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003)) were decided in a context where universities, 
corporations, and government agencies had all adapted   
to this definition of diversity by hiring an array of 
diversity managers, diversity consultants, and diversity 
directors, many of whom were assigned the task of 
finding the most efficient and profitable way to manage 
human differences of race,  ethnicity,  gender,  culture,  
and national origin. Sandra Day  O’Connor  makes  this 
logic apparent in her findings for Grutter v. Bollinger: 
“Diversity [in education] promotes  learning  outcomes 
and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse 
workforce” since “major American businesses have 
made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly 
global marketplace can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse peoples,  cultures,  ideas,  
and viewpoints” (Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). O’Connor’s 
reasoning reflects a new common sense developed 
within multinational corporate capitalism.  Bestsellers 
such as The Diversity Toolkit: How You Can Build and 
Benefit from a Diverse Workforce (Sonnenschein 1999) 
and Managing Diversity: People Skills for a Multicultural 
Workplace (Carr-Ruffino 1996) promised to teach 
corporate managers, in the words of the World Bank’s 
Human Resources website, “to value [human] differences 
and use them as strategic business assets” (Office of 
Diversity and Inclusion 2013). One might argue  that 
more is at stake than hiring multiracial, female, and 
lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender  (LGBT)  employees to 
rainbow-wash corporate agendas. Corporate diversity’s 
deeper violence is to claim all differences—material, 
cultural, communal, and epistemological—for capital 
management, that is, to recognize no difference that 
makes a difference, no knowledges, values, social 
forms, or associations that defer or displace capitalist 
globalization. 
In the first decades of the twenty-first century, 
diversity’s referent tends to slip back and forth, indexing 
with equal frequency both human differences in general 
and idealized attributes of the global economy. This 
slippage corresponds to the rise of neoliberal ideology 
and its mantra that competitive markets are the best 
way to manage unlike human capacities and other 
resources in the name of growth and improvement. 
Within the vocabulary of neoliberalism, diversity 
affirms the goodness of values such as “freedom” and 
“openness” and helps these values penetrate previously 
anti- or noncapitalist domains of social life, including 
education, religion, family, nonprofit organizations, 
and social services. As early as 1962, Milton Friedman 
argued in Capitalism and Freedom that truly free and 
prosperous societies arise only beside an unregulated 
market, which has “the great advantage” that it 
“permits wide diversity” (1962/2002, 15). This argument 
has become mainstream, in part as a result of the work 
done by the term “diversity” in portraying access to all 
the world’s goods and services as the key to entry into a 
postracist world of freedom and opportunity. 
Are there alternatives to this yoking of discussions of 
human difference to the goal of capital accumulation? 
One countervocabulary that emerges alongside the rise 
of diversity as a form of corporate management involves 
an alternative keyword: “difference.” In contrast to 
“diversity,” the roots of the term “difference” are found 
in the Afro-Asian solidarity movements of the 1950s and 
1960s and the social movement activism of the   1970s. 
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These movements sought to evade the contradictions of 
the Cold War by arguing that the different experiences 
of postcolonial societies—differences grounded  in 
the history of having undergone and defeated white 
supremacist colonization, in cultural epistemologies 
unlike those of the West, and in indigenous and non- 
Christian religious practices—meant that they should 
not have to fit into either capitalist or communist 
frameworks, with their shared values of productivity 
and geopolitical dominance (R. Wright 1956/1995; Von 
Eschen 1997). The term thus valorized nonnormative 
and marginalized social subjects as agents of change, 
insisting that cultures and communities forged by 
people calling themselves Black, Brown, American 
Indian, Asian, Militant, Radical, Lesbian, Feminist, and 
Queer were too valuable to be lost to assimilationist 
versions of “global diversity.” “Difference” pointed 
toward economic justice, based on an understanding  
of the racialized, gendered, and sexualized nature of 
political economy,  such as  that developed  in  women 
of color feminism (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981; Hong 
2006; I. Young 1990). 
Since the 1970s, American studies and cultural 
studies scholarship has been caught up in the conflict 
encapsulated by this struggle between discourses of 
diversity and difference. The stakes of the struggle 
are large. Whereas discourses of diversity suggest that 
group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death  
is a problem for democratic capitalist society and 
resolvable within its political economic structures, 
discourses of difference insist that the globalization of 
capitalism and its compatibility with only weak forms 
of political democracy is the problem. “Diversity” 
consequently appears in American studies and cultural 
studies scholarship with both positive and negative 
connotations. Sometimes, as in the groundbreaking 
Heath  Anthology  of  American  Literature,  the term 
“diversity” appears in a positive light, signifying the 
belief that a politics of multicultural recognition can 
dramatically increase racial democracy in the United 
States (Lauter 1994). At other times, the category of 
diversity is itself the problem. Often, this skepticism 
about the term is accompanied by commitments to 
support social movement knowledges, ranging from 
women of color feminism to diasporic queer activism, 
whose critical interventions demand a reckoning with 
material relations of enduring structural inequality 
propped up by liberal-democratic and multicultural 
norms. The result is that much scholarly effort has gone 
into preventing critical knowledge interventions, such 
as intersectional analysis, subaltern studies, Indigenous 
studies, and queer of color analysis, from being 
subsumed within the generalizing rhetoric of diversity. 
As market rationality saturates the usage of diversity 
within universities today, this scholarship draws on the 
genealogy of difference to point to the limits of diversity 
discourse as a means of advancing democratizing 
projects. In sharp contrast to the vague manner in 
which diversity discourse presents human differences,  
it cultivates new ways of thinking about the structural, 
historical, and material relations that determine who 
can relate to whom and under what conditions (Hong 
2006; Manalansan 2003; Nguyen 2012; Reddy 2011). 
Innovating new comparative analytics, such scholarship 
replaces “diversity” with terms such as “partition,” 
“transit,” “affinities,” “assemblage,” and “intimacies”  
to expose and imagine otherwise the connections and 
relations that sustain capital accumulation at the cost  
of generalized well-being (R. Gilmore 2012; Byrd 2011; 
Puar 2007; Lowe 2006; Hong and Ferguson 2011; Chuh 
2003). 
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